Tales from the Crypt #131: Matt Corallo + Valentine ...
MinerUpdate Interview: Matt Corallo on Mining ...
Mining Pool Centralization Tackled by Corallo's Bitcoin ...
Matt Corallo on the Social Good of Bitcoin and the Mindset ...
AMA Bitcoin Mining / Stratum V2 — We are Braiins, the company behind Slush Pool and Stratum V2. We’re joined by Matt Corallo and Peter Todd. Ask us anything!
Hi Bitcoin! We are Jan Capek (u/janbraiins) and Pavel Moravec (u/p-m-o), co-founders of Braiins (the company behind Slush Pool & Braiins OS). We recently published the specification for Stratum V2 — a new mining protocol that improves the decentralization, security, and efficiency of Bitcoin mining. We know the biggest issues miners and mining pools face based on our years of experience operating Slush Pool, and this protocol addresses those problems. You can find the documentation at stratumprotocol.org. Matt Corallo (u/TheBlueMatt) will also participate in the AMA. He joined us in Prague last September to hash out the details of the spec and his idea of allowing miners to select their own work in BetterHash is also implemented in Stratum V2. Peter Todd (u/petertodd) also joined the V2 team with his security expertise and will participate in this AMA. Ask us anything! We’ll try to begin answering questions on Thursday around 4pm CET (10am EST). P.S. The V2 technical specification is currently available to the public for comments and general feedback.
Hi Bitcoiners! I’m back with the 35th monthly Bitcoin news recap. For those unfamiliar, each day I pick out the most popularelevant/interesting stories in Bitcoin and save them. At the end of the month I release them in one batch, to give you a quick (but not necessarily the best) overview of what happened in bitcoin over the past month. You can see recaps of the previous months on Bitcoinsnippets.com A recap of Bitcoin in November 2019 Adoption
Will a high tx fee actually *increase* the expected confirmation time?
Suppose you are bitcoin miner (of any fork), with command of less than (say) 5% of the total hashpower, and you receive a transaction from a user that pays $50 of fee. Is it in your interest to forward that tx to other miners? Until Jan/2017 or so, the answer should have been "no". If other miners got (or will soon get) that tx by some other path, sending it again would be a pointless waste of bandwidth. So suppose that no one else will get it by other means. If you hold onto that tx and keep adding it to your candidate blocks, when you finally solve a block you will collect those $50. On the other hand, if you forward it to other miners, there is at least a 95% chance that some other miner will collect those $50. Since Jan/2017 the question became more complicated, because Matt Corallo's improved block propagation protocol (FIBRE) will transmit a block very fast if the receiving miner has already seen all transactions contained in it. Any transactions that he has not yet seen must be transmitted at that time; and the receiver cannot use or forward the block until all those "unseen" transactions have arrived. So, if you hold that transaction with $50 fee, and the other miners will not get it by some other means, when you finally solve a block you will have to send that transaction with it. Your block will take a bit longer to propagate to other miners. Then there is an increased chance that another miner will solve his block and forward it to everybody, while yours is still propagating. Then your block may be orphaned and you will lose the reward that you would otherwise have collected. The key parameter is the extra delay D that would be added to the propagation time of your block, if a single transaction in it was not seen by anyone else and had to be transmitted with the block. I don't know how much D can be. Let me guess that 1 extra unseen tx adds D = 6 milliseconds to the propagation time. The probability that some other miner will solve his block in those 6 milliseconds is 600/0.006 = 1/100'000. The block reward, at the current price, is about $50'000. Therefore, the expected loss for holding a transaction, if no one else will receive it by other means, is $0.50. It follows that, if the extra delay D is 6 ms and the price is $3800, you should not forward to other miners any transaction that pays more than $0.50 of fee. On average, you will earn more if you hold that transaction, and keep putting it into your candidate blocks, until you solve one. Makes sense? EDIT: By the way There is reason to suspect that the "full but non-mining" relays may not be doing their job.
Subject: File No. SR-NYSEArca-2017-06 From: Matt Corallo Sep. 11, 2017 I am Matt Corallo, a long-time developer of Bitcoin (around the 10th publicly recorded individual to contribute to the Bitcoin codebase), an expert on Bitcoin's operation, vocal Bitcoin advocate, and strong proponent of the availability of a Bitcoin Exchange-Traded Product (ETP). I have very grave concerns with the proposed rules for the maintaining of Bitcoin deposits and the lack of consumer protection in the event of Bitcoin Network rule changes in the current filings. As described in the S-1 filing for the "Bitcoin Investment Trust" (BIT), a "permanent fork" of Bitcoin may occur when two groups of users disagree as to the rules which define the system (its "consensus rules"). More specifically, such a "permanent fork" is likely to occur when one group of users wish to make a change to Bitcoin's consensus rules, while another group does not. This leads to two cryptocurrencies, and may lead to significant ambiguity around which should be referred to as "Bitcoin". The latest S-1 filing by the BIT, allows the BIT to, in the event of a permanent fork, "in consultation with the Index Provider, select a Bitcoin Network"; ie they will be allowed to select any cryptocurrency resulting from a permanent fork which they will term Bitcoin, with no clear restrictions. This creates a gaping divergence of interest between the Sponsor and the investors in the proposed ETP. Digital Currency Group ("DCG"), as the sole owner of the Sponsor, in conjunction with TradeBlock (the "Index Provider", in which DCG is an investor) would be enabled to, through such a selection, shift significant value towards one cryptocurrency over another. As an investor in numerous Bitcoin startups, DCG further has a strong incentive to encourage rule changes and adoption of cryptocurrencies which benefit their portfolio companies as well as their own operations, possibly over rule changes which benefit the investors in the proposed ETP. Further, in the currently-proposed rule changes, DCG is not explicitly barred from trading on the value of different cryptocurrencies prior to the announcement of the BIT's decision as to which fork will receive the future attention of the proposed Bitcoin ETP, and its investors' capital. Finally, it is important to note that, in the event of a permanent fork, there is likely to be significant market confusion as investors, businesses, and users decide which cryptocurrency they will term "Bitcoin". During this time period, the BIT is not restricted from selecting a cryptocurrency immediately (as it did on July 28th with respect to the Bitcoin Cash fork two days later ), nor restricted to selecting the cryptocurrency which the majority of the Bitcoin community terms "Bitcoin". In such a scenario, the BIT could cause significant longer-term market confusion, effectively misrepresenting itself to consumers, all while complying with its currently-proposed rules and filings. These scenarios are possibly best illustrated by the case of the Ethereum/Ethereum Classic fork, which the BIT S-1 lists as a prime example of such a "permanent fork". DCG invested heavily on one side of the fork, almost entirely at odds with the remainder of the Ethereum userbase, businesses, and exchanges. While the vast majority of market participants in Ethereum shifted their value to the new Ethereum Network, DCG promoted and invested in Ethereum Classic. If DCG had, at that time, owned the Sponsor of an Ethereum ETP under the proposed rules for the BIT ETP, they would be free to, and perfectly justified under the S-1 in, declaring the ETP to hold only Ethereum Classic, potentially to their own gain, and to significant market confusion. Recently, DCG and some of its portfolio companies have been strongly promoting "Segwit2x" (a proposed rule change to the Bitcoin Network). While it is still months off, the Bitcoin community is already split in whether it should be adopted, very likely leading to such a "permanent fork" and a debate over which cryptocurrency should be termed "Bitcoin" and which should adopt a new name. It is still very much an open question which cryptocurrency exchanges will adopt the BTC ticker symbol for, and whether significant market confusion will result. As a final note, the latest BIT S-1 claims that "as a practical matter, a modification to the source code only becomes part of the Bitcoin Network if accepted by participants collectively having a majority of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network". This may be somewhat misleading as it conflicts with the previous S-1 statements that the BIT is allowed to select a cryptocurrency which results from a permanent fork freely. Additionally, were it to be the case that the BIT simply followed the majority of processing power on the Bitcoin Network, it would likely lead to additional confusion as a significant majority of processing power on the Bitcoin network shifts back and forth between different forks as profitability of mining on each changes. As noted in several other comments provided in regards to SR-NYSEArca-2017-06, the adoption of rule changes to allow the listing of a Bitcoin ETP would be very much in line with the SEC's mission, and to the significant benefit of US consumers. However, additional rules must be put in place to protect investors in the event of a permanent fork of the Bitcoin network such as the one DCG and its portfolio companies is advocating for now, rules I believe to be rather straightforward and simple to write. Matt  While the Bitcoin Cash fork appeared highly unlikely to take the name "Bitcoin" with any large part of the community at the time, several prominent community members had, and have since, indicated that they would refer to Bitcoin Cash simply as "Bitcoin" if certain conditions are met. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/grayscale-investments-llc-statement-regarding-bitcoin-investment-trust-and-bitcoin-cash-300496137.html
The Hong Kong Agreement that has totally been breached by the Bitcoin Core Contributors.
On February 21st, 2016, in Hong Kong’s Cyberport, representatives from the bitcoin industry and members of the development community have agreed on the following points:
We understand that SegWit continues to be developed actively as a soft-fork and is likely to proceed towards release over the next two months, as originally scheduled.
We will continue to work with the entire Bitcoin protocol development community to develop, in public, a safe hard-fork based on the improvements in SegWit. The Bitcoin Core contributors present at the Bitcoin Roundtable will have an implementation of such a hard-fork available as a recommendation to Bitcoin Core within three months after the release of SegWit.
This hard-fork is expected to include features which are currently being discussed within technical communities, including an increase in the non-witness data to be around 2 MB, with the total size no more than 4 MB, and will only be adopted with broad support across the entire Bitcoin community.
We will run a SegWit release in production by the time such a hard-fork is released in a version of Bitcoin Core.
We will only run Bitcoin Core-compatible consensus systems, eventually containing both SegWit and the hard-fork, in production, for the foreseeable future. *We are committed to scaling technologies which use block space more efficiently, such as Schnorr multisig.
Based on the above points, the timeline will likely follow the below dates.
SegWit is expected to be released in April 2016.
The code for the hard-fork will therefore be available by July 2016.
If there is strong community support, the hard-fork activation will likely happen around July 2017.
The undersigned support this roadmap. Together, we are: Kevin Pan - Manager - AntPool Anatoly Legkodymov - CEO - A-XBT Larry Salibra - Bitcoin Association Hong Kong Leonhard Weese - Bitcoin Association Hong Kong Cory Fields - Bitcoin Core Contributor Johnson Lau - Bitcoin Core Contributor Luke Dashjr - Bitcoin Core Contributor Matt Corallo - Bitcoin Core Contributor Peter Todd - Bitcoin Core Contributor Kang Xie - Bitcoin Roundtable Phil Potter - Chief Strategy Officer - Bitfinex Valery Vavilov - CEO - BitFury Alex Petrov - CIO - BitFury Jihan Wu - Co-CEO - Bitmain Micree Zhan - Co-CEO - Bitmain James Hilliard - Pool/Farm Admin - BitmainWarranty Yoshi Goto - CEO - BitmainWarranty Alex Shultz - CEO - BIT-X Exchange Han Solo - CEO - Blockcloud Adam Back - President - Blockstream Bobby Lee - CEO - BTCC Samson Mow - COO - BTCC Robin Yao - CTO - BW Obi Nwosu - Managing Director - Coinfloor Mark Lamb - Founder - Coinfloor Wang Chun - Admin - F2Pool Marco Streng - CEO - Genesis Mining Marco Krohn - CFO - Genesis Mining Oleksandr Lutskevych - CEO - GHash.IO & CEX.IO Wu Gang - CEO - HaoBTC Leon Li - CEO - Huobi Zhang Jian - Vice President - Huobi Eric Larchevêque - CEO - Ledger Jack Liao - CEO - LIGHTNINGASIC & BitExchange Star Xu - CEO - OKCoin Jack Liu - Head of International - OKCoin Guy Corem - CEO - Spondoolies-Tech Pindar Wong - Sponsor
What is up with all these Bitcoin devs who think that their job includes HARD-CODING CERTAIN VALUES THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO BE USER-CONFIGURABLE (eg: "seed servers")?
Recently, the developer of SegWit2x / BTC1, Jeff Garzik, caused some controversy by hard-coding the "seed servers" which Bitcoin uses to first start hunting for "peers". Worse than that: apparently one of the "seeds" is a company he started, variously named Chainalysis / Skry / Bloq - which apparently specializes in de-anonymizing Bitcoin transactions and performing KYC/AML - and which also has apparently entered into agreements with Interpol. Seriously, WTF??? This is what "Bitcoin devs" still consider to be part of their "job" - hard-coding parameters like this, which affect everyone else on the network - and which could easily be "exposed" to be made user-configurable - instead of being baked into the source code and requiring a friggin' recompile to change??? This recent event has refocused attention on the fact all these past years, most of these seed servers in "the" existing (legacy) client running on most of the network have _also been hard-coded - to domains under the control of "devs associated with Blockstream".
I don't like the list of seed servers in Bitcoin Core Pieter Wuille - does not support BIP148 - works for Blockstream Matt Corallo - does not support BIP148 - works for Blockstream Luke Dashjr - supports BIP148 - works for Blockstream Christian Decker - supports BIP148 - works for Blockstream Jonas Schnelli - supports BIP148 Peter Todd - supports BIP148 - worked for Samson Mow who works for Blockstream
...and the key thing with that is being able to control what nodes a node connects to can be a very powerful tool to attack new nodes, as it lets you prevent a node from learning about the valid chain with the most work.
4 out of 5 people running the bitcoin networks seed servers are directly associated with Blockstream! I don't even believe that Blockstream is actually plotting an evil, forceful takeover of bitcoin using the seed servers. However it beautifully counteracts Adam's "decentralization is everything" arguments. What is most troublesome to me, is that this simple information is not allowed to appear on r\bitcoin at all.
https://np.reddit.com/btc/comments/6n8vqc/the_corporate_takeover_of_bitcoin_illustrated_in/ Seriously? Bitcoin is almost 9 years old - and most people are still running clients which use hard-coded values (which require an inconvenient recompile to reconfigure) for the "seed servers"?? Maybe this is, in some sense, part of the reason why people like BlueMatt and Luke-Jr and Pieter Wiulle think they can lord it over us and tell everyone else what to do? ...because they have quietly (and unfairly / incompetently) hard-coded their own friggin' server domain names directly into everyone else's client code, as our "seed servers"? Is the low level of "quality" we - as a community - have become accustomed to from our devs? Do other clients (Bitcoin Classic, Bitcoin Unlimited and Bitcoin ABC) also gratuitously hard-code their "seed servers" like this? Here's a post from a year ago regarding "seed servers" in Classic:
How come "classic" uses the same alert keys/DNS seeds as Core?
https://np.reddit.com/btc/comments/44atsp/how_come_classic_uses_the_same_alert_keysdns/ Meanwhile, here's the main question: Why are any "serious" Bitcoin clients still "gratuitously" hard-coding any values like this? Why has our "ecosystem" / "community" not naturally evolved to the point where we have some public "wiki" pages listing all the "good" (community-recognized, popular) seed servers - and every user configures their own client software by choosing who they want from this list? (Maybe because we've been distracted by bullshit for these past few years, fighting with these very same devs because they've refused provide any support for users who want bigger blocks?) What would users have to do if (God forbid) something were to happen to the servers of those 4-5 seed servers which are currently hard-coded into nearly everyone's clients? In that situation (assuming some "new" seed servers quickly appeared) people would be have two options:
Edit their C++ source code and download/install a (trusted, verified) C++ compiler (if they don't already have one), and recompile the friggin' code; or
Wait until new binaries got posted online - and download them (and verify them).
Seriously? This unnecessary "centralization point" (or major inconvenience / bottleneck) has been sitting in our code this entire time - while these supposedly knowledgeable devs keep beating us over their head with their mantra of "decentralization" - which they have actually been doing so little to maximize?
Psycho-Socio-Economic Side Bar Serious (but delicate/senstive) question: How many of these "devs" have developed (possibly unconscious?) behaviors in life where they try to make users dependent on them? "Vendor lock-in" is a thing - a very bad thing, which certain Bitcoin devs have exhibited a tendency to inflict on users - in many cases due to rather obvious (psychological, social, and/or economic) reasons. We should gently (but firmly) reject these tendencies whenever any dev exhibits them.
Our community should expect and demand an accessible, user-friendly interface for all user-configurable parameters - to maximize decentralization and autonomy
In "command-line" versions of the client program, these kind of parameters should be:
in a separate config file - using some ultra-simple, standard format such as YAML or JSON
also configurable via options (eg, --seed-server) upon invocation on the command-line
In GUI versions version of the client program (using some popular cross-platform standard such as Qt, HTML, etc.) these kind of parameters should be exposed as user-configurable options.
Yes, these user-configurable values for things like "seed servers" (or "max blocksize") could come pre-configured to "sensible defaults - so that the software will work "out of the box" (immediately upon downloading and installing) - with no initial configuration required by the user. Yes: Even the blocksize has always been user-configurable - but most users don't know this, because most devs have been hiding this fact from us. Three recent posts by u/ForkiusMaximus explained how Adjustable-Blocksize-Cap (ABC) Bitcoin clients shatter this illusion:
Adjustable-blocksize-cap (ABC) clients give miners exactly zero additional power. BU, Classic, and other ABC clients are really just an argument in code form, shattering the illusion that devs are part of the governance structure.
https://np.reddit.com/btc/comments/602vsy/clearing_up_some_widespread_confusions_about_bu/ Note about Bitcoin ABC vs Bitcoin Unlimited: There is a specific new Bitcoin client called Bitcoin ABC, which functions similar to Bitcoin Unlimited - with the important difference that Bitcoin ABC is _guaranteed to hard-fork to bigger blocks on August 1_. (Please correct me if I'm wrong about this. Documentation for the behavior of these various hard-forks is currently still rather disorganized :-) All serious devs should be expected to provide code which does not require a "recompile" to change these "initial, sensible" default parameters. I mean - come on. Even back in the 80s people had "*.INI" files on DOS and Windows. Nearly all users understand and know how to set user-configurable values - for decades. How many people are familiar with using a program which has a "Preferences" screen? (Sometimes you may have to close and re-open the program in order for your new preferences to take effect.) This is really basic, basic functionality which nearly all software provides via a GUI (and or config file and/or command-line options). And nearly all devs have been offering this kind of functionality - in either command-line parameters, config files, and/or graphic user interfaces (GUIs). Except most Bitcoin devs. The state of "software development" for Bitcoin clients seems really messed up in certain ways like this. As users, we need to start demanding simple, standard features in our client software - such as accessible, user-friendly configurability of parameter values - without the massive inconvenience of a recompile. What is a "Bitcoin client"? After nearly 9 years in operation, our community should by now have a basic concept or definition of what a "Bitcoin client" is / does - probably something along the lines of:
A Bitcoin client is a device for reading (and optionally appending to) the immutable Bitcoin Blockchain.
Based on that general concept / definition, a program which does all of the above and also gratuitously "hard-codes" a bunch of domain names for "seed servers" is not quite the same thing as a "a Bitcoin client". Such an "overspecialized" client actually provides merely a subset of the full functionality of a true "Bitcoin client", eg:
An "overspecialized" client only enables connecting to certain "seed servers" upon startup (in accordance with the "gratuitous opinion" of the dev who (mis)translated the community's conceptual specifications to C++ code)
An "overspecialized" client only enables mining blocks less that a certain size (in accordance with the "gratuitous opinion" of the dev who (mis)translated the community's conceptual specifications to C++ code)
One of the main problems with nearly all Bitcoin clients developed so far is that they are gratuitously opinionated: they "gratuitously" hard-code particular values (eg, "max blocksize", "seed servers") which are not part of the whitepaper, and not part of the generally accepted definition of a "Bitcoin client". This failure on the part of devs to provide Bitcoin clients which behave in accordance with the community's specification of "Bitcoin clients" is seriously damaging Bitcoin - and needs to be fixed as soon as possible. Right now is a good opportunity - with so many new Bitcoin clients popping up, as the community prepares to fork. All devs working on various Bitcoin client software offerings need to wake up and realize that there is about to be a major battle to find out which Bitcoin client software offering performs "best" (in the user-interface sense - and ultimately in the economic sense) at:
reading (and optionally appending to) the immutable Bitcoin Blockchain
The Bitcoin client software offerings which can optimally (and most simply and securely :-) "satisfy" the above specification (and not merely some gratuitously overspecialized "subset" of it) will have the most success.
Mining is how you vote for rule changes. Greg's comments on BU revealed he has no idea how Bitcoin works. He thought "honest" meant "plays by Core rules." [But] there is no "honesty" involved. There is only the assumption that the majority of miners are INTELLIGENTLY PROFIT-SEEKING. - ForkiusMaximus
The title of this post is a compressed summary combining some important quotes from several recent comments by u/ForkiusMaximus, which I thought were worth highlighting here in a post of their own. His comments remind us that Bitcoin was already brilliantly designed by Satoshi so that the majority of "honest""intelligently profit-seeking" miners will always be economically incentivized to use their hashpower to vote for the rule changes which will maximize their (and everyone else's) Bitcoin profits - and they will always do this regardless of any censorship or centralized dev teams. Meanwhile, Core/Blockstream (and their supporters) totally fail to understand this subtle but vital point: they think that devs somehow control Bitcoin, by forcing people to run certain code... or moderators somehow control Bitcoin, by censoring certain forums... or now non-mining nodes can somehow control Bitcoin by suggesting a futile and pointless "user-activated soft-fork" (UASF) - ie a fork not supported by actual mining hashpower. This all shows that Core/Blockstream (and their supporters) have a fundamental misunderstanding of the most important aspect of Bitcoin - the fact that:
Bitcoin is controlled by not by devs... or censors... or non-mining nodes.
Bitcoin is controlled by the economic incentives designed by Satoshi, where the vast majority of "honest" "intelligently profit-seeking" miners will always use their hashpower to vote for the rules which will maximize their Bitcoin profits (and our Bitcoin profits as well :-).
This is why the 21 million coin cap will never get increased. And this is why blocksizes will always continue to moderately increase. Not because some dev team made it "hard" to modify these settings in the code. And not because some moderator censored some discussion about some alternative clients. The reason Bitcoin works is simply because the vast majority of miners are "honest" "intelligently profit-seeking". This is why mining support for Core/Blockstream's centrally-planned blocksize has dropped to 2/3 of network hashpower (despite their big team of "experts" and all their censorship and fiat funding). And this is why 1/3 of mining hashpower has already started voting for some form of market-driven blocksizes... ... not because BU or Classic suddenly "gave" them this power (after all, they always had this power themselves)... ... but simply because the vast majority of miners are "honest" "intelligently profit-seeking", and they know that bigger blocks will bring higher profits. So, miners have always been able to use their hashpower (and even modify the Bitcoin client source code if they wanted) in order to vote for rule changes which would support bigger blocksizes and higher Bitcoin profits for everyone - with or without any help from BU, Classic, etc. - and there is nothing that any dev team (or any censored forum) can do to prevent miners from doing this. So it is inevitable that miners will use their hashpower to vote for bigger blocksizes, because this means much higher Bitcoin profits for them (and also bigger Bitcoin profits for the rest of us :-)... simply because (as Satoshi clearly did understand, but most Core/Blockstream devs clearly do not understand):
The vast majority of miners are "honest" "intelligently profit-seeking".
We don't have to trust [miners] to be "honest" as Satoshi unfortunately worded it. Replace the term honest with "intelligently profit-seeking." Bitcoin assumes miners are intelligently profit-seeking, meaning that they have a decent enough read on what the ecosystem wants that they can and will make any necessary changes to please the ecosystem and thus boost their own bottom line. Greg's recent comments on BU totally discredited him, as he revealed himself to have no friggin' idea how Bitcoin works. He actually thought "honest" meant something like "plays by Core rules." That's a completely broken understanding of Bitcoin, and implies centralization. It's the kind of misconception I'd expect from a run-of-the-mill nobody on a forum, not from the mighty leader of Core/BS. I'm kinda pissed I wasted mental clock ticks trying to debate this guy without realizing he has not just a flawed understanding, but zero understanding of how Bitcoin works at all. And of course all his supporters parrot his nonsense view of how Bitcoin supposedly works.
Mining control is the key invention of Bitcoin. It's how it doesn't just devolve into yet another failed subjective monetary scheme. If you don't like it, you should figure out another scheme. Perhaps proof of stake is more your thing? Also, it's pretty amazing that you think just because BU makes it more convenient for miners to do what they always could do, that that somehow dooms Bitcoin. If that dooms it, it was already a dead man walking. How do you propose to stop miners from altering their own blocksize settings? If you have no answer, you have no grounds to attack BU without falling into the category of being a Bitcoin skeptic.
It's actually fairly subtle: mining IS how you vote for rule changes, BUT miners have every incentive to vote with the market, so they DON'T have any meaningful ability to push rules on the community (even under BU). There is no trust or "honesty" involved, as Satoshi unfortunately worded it. There is only the underlying assumption that makes Bitcoin work: the assumption that the vast majority of miners are INTELLIGENTLY PROFIT-SEEKING. The only way this system can break is if the majority of miners seek something other than profit (say a government took the major mining pools over and somehow hashers couldn't switch away in time), or the miners misjudge what the market wants (due to a failure of market communication). However, in this case and on these timescales it is obvious the current crop of miners are generally profit-seeking. And if they are misjudging the market, we have a remedy: we can resolve that through fork futures trading on the exchanges. Note that this is just moving the decision from the first kind of investors (miners) to the general investing public. Miners are a first-line proxy for investors in general. If they fail to reflect investor will, investors are free to take it to the market by forking and trading the two sides of the fork (preferably as futures so as to avoid scrambling to upgrade urgently). Also important would be to maximize freedom of discussion so that market communication is not distorted. Finally, the whole idea of the UASF people, that we would poll the ecosystem somehow to prove the economic majority wants some change, already means that merely showing this proof to the miners should convince them, as they are intelligently profit-seeking. But that obviates the need for a UASF in the first place (!).
I used to think they don't understand markets, but in fact they are stuck at an even more basic level than that. I took a spin through the wreckage of /Bitcoin today for the first time in weeks. It was pleasantly surprising to see how with the ramping up of miner support for BU, the Core arguments have been reduced to obvious fundamental misunderstandings of Bitcoin that are now trivial to rebut. In a word, they haven't actually grasped the concept of incentives. This goes all the way to the top, not just the supporters but the key Core devs themselves. They don't understand markets, yes, but it's not like they are even close. They lack the understanding of even the fundamental building blocks of markets. When you think about it, governance by incentives is pretty subtle. Even if one reads the whitepaper and goes, "Oh yeah I see, miners would be motivated not to kill the golden goose in that situation," it is quite another matter to fully internalize the fact that the only reason Bitcoin is a thing at all is because of the assumption that miners are not idiots. Or more accurately, that miners as a group will never have a gross failure to correctly apprehend the wishes of the market. This is the source of all the weird claims about miners controlling or not controlling Bitcoin. Core and Blockstream dev Matt Corallo thinks that if miners were allowed to (not mentioning how they could be disallowed to), they would mine extra coins for all the "extra profits." Again this goes beyond failing to understand markets, all the way down to failing to understand or take seriously incentives as a concept at all. I'm not blaming him, he's a coder; I blame those who take his commentary on non-coding matters seriously, merely by dint of his coding skill. A constant refrain from Core supporters as BU gain hashpower is that "miners don't control Bitcoin." This is actually correct: miners don't control Bitcoin, they won't act against the economic majority. But not because they can't. They certainly can, just like oncoming traffic can swerve toward you on the freeway. But they don't, because that would destroy them as well. Thus is the subtlety of governance by incentives. Miners have control, but they won't use it to do anything that displeases the ecosystem, on balance. Or they might, but in that case Bitcoin is a failed concept as its fundamental assumption is then proven to be broken. Many or most anti-BU arguments unwittingly take that form: they start with the premise that Bitcoin is broken [i.e., miners are idiots or that they grossly fail to read the market] and reason from there to conclude that BU is broken. Examples include the median EB attack, the various big block attacks, and the bizarre claim that BU has a "new security model" because it "lets miners do something they couldn't before" (ironically implying Core has snuck in a new security model where they try to restrain miners by making it inconvenient for them to change a blocksize setting). Hence we see that it isn't merely a matter of Core and Blockstream people having initially dismissed Bitcoin and then later seeing the light when the price rises forced them to look deeper. They in fact still haven't seen the light. They never fully understood the basic dynamic that makes Bitcoin tick, let alone understanding higher level concepts like markets. This is why they so easily fall into the central planning mindset, seeing Bitcoin as a fragile little thing that must be defended by their wise paternalistic guidance. The Core devs have replaced the fundamental assumption in the whitepaper, that most miners are honest (I prefer "most miners are not idiots" as it is harder to misinterpret), with the fundamental assumption that the right set of people (or the right repository governance structure) is in charge of the "reference implementation." This manifests as a kind of envy toward the miners and comes with all the other curious trappings of the Core worldview: the code is the spec, hard forks are dangerous, Core = Bitcoin, anything that deviates from Core diktats is an "altcoin," it doesn't count as censorship to delete discussion of alternative clients as they are "off topic," nodes > miners, anything that makes it a bit easier for miners to do something Core doesn't like is an "attack" on Bitcoin, centralized control by Core is necessary to preserve decentralization, UASF is a viable idea, Segwit has consensus among "the Bitcoin experts," and so on.
Estimated Core hashrate down below 2/3 already. Core has lost supermajority status, even with all the historical inertia, miner conservatism, and crackerjack programmers they are reported to have on their side. Even with the "consensus" of "the experts." Even with two years of mindbendingly extreme censorship in their favor on the two biggest Bitcoin discussion forums.
The Core devs have directly created this situation by keeping the blocksize cap locked down long after it became controversial. The logic of how users make needed changes to the protocol, as mentioned in the whitepaper, requires that users be able to easily adjust any settings that are controversial, so as to be able to "vote with their CPU" power in a smooth manner. Core tries to leverage their waning "reference implementation" status to rig the vote by deliberately leaving the now maximally controversial blocksize limit hard-coded, forcing the user to venture out into relatively new dev team offerings if they want to cast a vote. This is exactly how you create the conditions for a contentious split. They have brought this upon themselves entirely.
Adam implies BU is pre-alpha, yet it is winning in the only arena where people actually put their money where their mouths are. How pathetic does it make Core that they are losing to a pre-alpha client?
Yes, Bitcoin was always supposed to be gold 2.0: digital gold that you could use like cash, so you could spend it anywhere without needing banks and gold notes to make it useful. So why is Core trying to turn it back into gold 1.0? (112 points, 85 comments)
In October 2010 Satoshi proposed a hard fork block size upgrade. This proposed upgrade was a fundamental factor in many people's decision to invest, myself included. BCH implemented this upgrade. BTC did not. (74 points, 41 comments)
what do the following have in common: Australia, Canada, USA, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Liberia, Namibia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Caribbean Netherlands, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Zimbabwe (47 points, 20 comments)
BCH is victim to one of the biggest manipulation campaigns in social media: Any mention of BCH triggered users instantly to spam "BCASH".. until BSV which is a BCH fork and almost identical to it pre-November fork popped out of nowhere and suddenly social media is spammed with pro-BSV posts. (131 points, 138 comments)
LocalBitcoins just banned cash. It really only goes to show everything in the BTC ecosystem is compromised. (122 points, 42 comments)
The new narrative of the shills who moved to promoting bsv: Bitcoin was meant to be government-friendly (33 points, 138 comments)
PSA: The economical model of the Lightning Network is unsound. The LN will support different coins which will be interconnected and since the LN tokens will be transacted instead of the base coins backing them up their value will be eroded over time. (14 points, 8 comments)
94 points: ThomasZander's comment in "Not a huge @rogerkver fan and never really used $BCH. But he wiped up the floor with @ToneVays in Malta, and even if you happen to despise BCH, it’s foolish and shortsighted not to take these criticisms seriously. $BTC is very expensive and very slow."
87 points: tjonak's comment in A Reminder Why You Shouldn’t Use Google.
86 points: money78's comment in Tone Vays: "So I will admit, I did terrible in the Malta Debate vs @rogerkver [...]"
83 points: discoltk's comment in "Not a huge @rogerkver fan and never really used $BCH. But he wiped up the floor with @ToneVays in Malta, and even if you happen to despise BCH, it’s foolish and shortsighted not to take these criticisms seriously. $BTC is very expensive and very slow."
79 points: jessquit's comment in Ways to trigger a Shitcoin influencer Part 1: Remind them that’s it’s very likely they got paid to shill fake Bitcoin to Noobs
There are hundreds of developers who contribute to Bitcoin Core. Over 50 of them have 10+ commits to Bitcoin Core.
Blockstream employs 7 of these developers, including Pieter Wuille, Luke Dashjr, Greg Maxwell, Jorge Timon, Patrick Strateman, Warren Togami and Mark Friedenbach.
By number of commits, the developers Blockstream employs are ranked #2, #8, #13, #14, #19, #35, and #50, respectively.
Another company called ChainCode Labs employs 3 of the top 50 developers, including Alex Morcos, Suhas Daftuar, and Matt Corallo (formerly employed by Blockstream).
By number of commits, the developers ChainCode employs are ranked #5, #11 and #12, respectively.
As for SegWit, it is a multi-faceted gold-mine of an update with many, many benefits to scaling, security and efficiency:
It fixes the substantial transaction malleability problem once and for all.
It improves the efficiency of signature-hashing so it scales linearly rather than quadratically.
It 1.7x's the # of single-signature transactions per block and 4x's the # of multi-signature transactions per block.
It enables second-layer scaling solutions like Lightning.
It upgrades pay-to-script-hash transactions from 160-bit hashes to 256-bit hashes.
It makes it safer for hardware wallets to sign transactions by explicitly hashing input values.
It reduces the growth of the system's most burdensome resource: unspent transaction outputs, which are ideally kept in memory.
It introduces versioning for the scripting language to allow for more easy upgradeability.
The trust in the BU development team has faded   . (It's more legit if it looks as if it has sources. You know what I'm talking about... the bugs that have been found, the fact that it can't keep up with Core's commits, the fact that Core developers aren't jumping ship to it, the fact that it looks less active even compared to Classic - which has a smaller "market share").
The trust in the reasons for which some miners were supporting BU has faded  . I'm guessing that we were all hoping that they hate censorship and manipulation, just like we do, but for Jihan for example - the reasons might be different. I first became suspicious of it when he sharedMR_hehe's post, saying this:
If 2nd layer protocols become a reality, many bitcoin transactions will go through 2nd layer networks and not via miners. Miners won't receive transaction fees for them. The mining community obviously feel unhappy about this.
The covert form of ASICBOOST (where they don't use the version field, the form that was only recently publicly discovered) would only show up as a higher than usual number of empty blocks or blocks with reordered or missing transactions (depending on how the attacker implemented it; it's not necessarily both).
IMO, the long term objectives should be:
remove as many of the forms of manipulation as possible (for example censorship from /bitcoin, centralized exchanges, DOS attacks, and so on)
hard fork at some point in the future away from the current repository, hopefully to one that is distributed (updates wouldn't come from a central location - GitHub - and they could be voted on) and add a governance system to Bitcoin, where we can make decisions like paying developers (as DASH does it, or BOScoin in the future)
instantly confirmed transactions (businesses need that)
move to something akin to POS, and the capability of hundreds of thousands of transactions... per second
make running nodes either very light on computing resources or paid somehow
keep convincing businesses to accept cryptocurrencies as a method of payment, because that's how you completely eliminate banks and central banks from the equation
etc. Note that without utility for people and businesses, Bitcoin is just a complex and very effective pyramid scheme. No wonder you're only allowed to post "BUY BUY BUY HOLD!!" in /bitcoin. Also note that DASH is already doing some of the stuff above. Maybe we should just do a Bitcoin genesis block with DASH's source code lol. There's little financial interest in my recommendation, as I've already sold most of my Bitcoins for ETH. I'm sure many others from /btc have done the same. But I still want most cryptocurrencies to succeed, not just the ones I'm "invested" in. I want banks to fail. EDIT: looking at the comments, some people want hard fork SegWit, others want BU, others want soft fork FlexTrans, others want extension blocks... Really, we can't pull in so many different directions. We'll just move slowly somewhere in between, and in the tech word you remain behind when that happens.
I was planning to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little less than a year from now. But this process of peer review turned up a technical issue that needs to get addressed, and I don’t think it can be fixed in time for the first 0.11 release. I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now... please send me an email ([email protected]) if I am missing any arguments
In other words, Gavin proposed a hard fork via a series of blog posts, bypassing all developer communication channels altogether and asking for personal, private emails from anyone interested in discussing the proposal further. On May 5 (1 day after Gavin submitted his first blog post), Mike Hearn published The capacity cliff on his Medium page. 2 days later, he posted Crash landing. In these posts, he argued:
A common argument for letting Bitcoin blocks fill up is that the outcome won’t be so bad: just a market for fees... this is wrong. I don’t believe fees will become high and stable if Bitcoin runs out of capacity. Instead, I believe Bitcoin will crash. ...a permanent backlog would start to build up... as the backlog grows, nodes will start running out of memory and dying... as Core will accept any transaction that’s valid without any limit a node crash is eventually inevitable.
He also, in the latter article, explained that he disagreed with Satoshi's vision for how Bitcoin would mature:
Neither me nor Gavin believe a fee market will work as a substitute for the inflation subsidy.
Gavin continued to publish the series of blog posts he had announced while Hearn made these predictions.  Matt Corallo brought Gavin's proposal up on the bitcoin-dev mailing list after a few days. He wrote:
Recently there has been a flurry of posts by Gavin at http://gavinandresen.svbtle.com/ which advocate strongly for increasing the maximum block size. However, there hasnt been any discussion on this mailing list in several years as far as I can tell... So, at the risk of starting a flamewar, I'll provide a little bait to get some responses and hope the discussion opens up into an honest comparison of the tradeoffs here. Certainly a consensus in this kind of technical community should be a basic requirement for any serious commitment to blocksize increase. Personally, I'm rather strongly against any commitment to a block size increase in the near future. Long-term incentive compatibility requires that there be some fee pressure, and that blocks be relatively consistently full or very nearly full. What we see today are transactions enjoying next-block confirmations with nearly zero pressure to include any fee at all (though many do because it makes wallet code simpler). This allows the well-funded Bitcoin ecosystem to continue building systems which rely on transactions moving quickly into blocks while pretending these systems scale. Thus, instead of working on technologies which bring Bitcoin's trustlessness to systems which scale beyond a blockchain's necessarily slow and (compared to updating numbers in a database) expensive settlement, the ecosystem as a whole continues to focus on building centralized platforms and advocate for changes to Bitcoin which allow them to maintain the status quo
The point of the hard block size limit is exactly because giving miners free rule to do anything they like with their blocks would allow them to do any number of crazy attacks. The incentives for miners to pick block sizes are no where near compatible with what allows the network to continue to run in a decentralized manner.
I'm not so much opposed to a block size increase as I am opposed to a hard fork... I strongly fear that the hard fork itself will become an excuse to change other aspects of the system in ways that will have unintended and possibly disastrous consequences.
there has been significant public discussion... about why increasing the max block size is kicking the can down the road while possibly compromising blockchain security. There were many excellent objections that were raised that, sadly, I see are not referenced at all in the recent media blitz. Frankly I can't help but feel that if contributions, like those from #bitcoin-wizards, have been ignored in lieu of technical analysis, and the absence of discussion on this mailing list, that I feel perhaps there are other subtle and extremely important technical details that are completely absent from this--and other-- proposals. Secured decentralization is the most important and most interesting property of bitcoin. Everything else is rather trivial and could be achieved millions of times more efficiently with conventional technology. Our technical work should be informed by the technical nature of the system we have constructed. There's no doubt in my mind that bitcoin will always see the most extreme campaigns and the most extreme misunderstandings... for development purposes we must hold ourselves to extremely high standards before proposing changes, especially to the public, that have the potential to be unsafe and economically unsafe. There are many potential technical solutions for aggregating millions (trillions?) of transactions into tiny bundles. As a small proof-of-concept, imagine two parties sending transactions back and forth 100 million times. Instead of recording every transaction, you could record the start state and the end state, and end up with two transactions or less. That's a 100 million fold, without modifying max block size and without potentially compromising secured decentralization. The MIT group should listen up and get to work figuring out how to measure decentralization and its security.. Getting this measurement right would be really beneficial because we would have a more academic and technical understanding to work with.
When Bitcoin is changed fundamentally, via a hard fork, to have different properties, the change can create winners or losers... There are non-trivial number of people who hold extremes on any of these general belief patterns; Even among the core developers there is not a consensus on Bitcoin's optimal role in society and the commercial marketplace. there is a at least a two fold concern on this particular ("Long term Mining incentives") front: One is that the long-held argument is that security of the Bitcoin system in the long term depends on fee income funding autonomous, anonymous, decentralized miners profitably applying enough hash-power to make reorganizations infeasible. For fees to achieve this purpose, there seemingly must be an effective scarcity of capacity. The second is that when subsidy has fallen well below fees, the incentive to move the blockchain forward goes away. An optimal rational miner would be best off forking off the current best block in order to capture its fees, rather than moving the blockchain forward... tools like the Lightning network proposal could well allow us to hit a greater spectrum of demands at once--including secure zero-confirmation (something that larger blocksizes reduce if anything), which is important for many applications. With the right technology I believe we can have our cake and eat it too, but there needs to be a reason to build it; the security and decentralization level of Bitcoin imposes a hard upper limit on anything that can be based on it. Another key point here is that the small bumps in blocksize which wouldn't clearly knock the system into a largely centralized mode--small constants--are small enough that they don't quantitatively change the operation of the system; they don't open up new applications that aren't possible today the procedure I'd prefer would be something like this: if there is a standing backlog, we-the-community of users look to indicators to gauge if the network is losing decentralization and then double the hard limit with proper controls to allow smooth adjustment without fees going to zero (see the past proposals for automatic block size controls that let miners increase up to a hard maximum over the median if they mine at quadratically harder difficulty), and we don't increase if it appears it would be at a substantial increase in centralization risk. Hardfork changes should only be made if they're almost completely uncontroversial--where virtually everyone can look at the available data and say "yea, that isn't undermining my property rights or future use of Bitcoin; it's no big deal". Unfortunately, every indicator I can think of except fee totals has been going in the wrong direction almost monotonically along with the blockchain size increase since 2012 when we started hitting full blocks and responded by increasing the default soft target. This is frustrating many people--myself included--have been working feverishly hard behind the scenes on Bitcoin Core to increase the scalability. This work isn't small-potatoes boring software engineering stuff; I mean even my personal contributions include things like inventing a wholly new generic algebraic optimization applicable to all EC signature schemes that increases performance by 4%, and that is before getting into the R&D stuff that hasn't really borne fruit yet, like fraud proofs. Today Bitcoin Core is easily >100 times faster to synchronize and relay than when I first got involved on the same hardware, but these improvements have been swallowed by the growth. The ironic thing is that our frantic efforts to keep ahead and not lose decentralization have both not been enough (by the best measures, full node usage is the lowest its been since 2011 even though the user base is huge now) and yet also so much that people could seriously talk about increasing the block size to something gigantic like 20MB. This sounds less reasonable when you realize that even at 1MB we'd likely have a smoking hole in the ground if not for existing enormous efforts to make scaling not come at a loss of decentralization.
In short, without either a fixed blocksize or fixed fee per transaction Bitcoin will will not survive as there is no viable way to pay for PoW security. The latter option - fixed fee per transaction - is non-trivial to implement in a way that's actually meaningful - it's easy to give miners "kickbacks" - leaving us with a fixed blocksize. Even a relatively small increase to 20MB will greatly reduce the number of people who can participate fully in Bitcoin, creating an environment where the next increase requires the consent of an even smaller portion of the Bitcoin ecosystem. Where does that stop? What's the proposed mechanism that'll create an incentive and social consensus to not just 'kick the can down the road'(3) and further centralize but actually scale up Bitcoin the hard way?
I am - in general - in favor of increasing the size blocks... Controversial hard forks. I hope the mailing list here today already proves it is a controversial issue. Independent of personal opinions pro or against, I don't think we can do a hard fork that is controversial in nature. Either the result is effectively a fork, and pre-existing coins can be spent once on both sides (effectively failing Bitcoin's primary purpose), or the result is one side forced to upgrade to something they dislike - effectively giving a power to developers they should never have. Quoting someone: "I did not sign up to be part of a central banker's committee". The reason for increasing is "need". If "we need more space in blocks" is the reason to do an upgrade, it won't stop after 20 MB. There is nothing fundamental possible with 20 MB blocks that isn't with 1 MB blocks. Misrepresentation of the trade-offs. You can argue all you want that none of the effects of larger blocks are particularly damaging, so everything is fine. They will damage something (see below for details), and we should analyze these effects, and be honest about them, and present them as a trade-off made we choose to make to scale the system better. If you just ask people if they want more transactions, of course you'll hear yes. If you ask people if they want to pay less taxes, I'm sure the vast majority will agree as well. Miner centralization. There is currently, as far as I know, no technology that can relay and validate 20 MB blocks across the planet, in a manner fast enough to avoid very significant costs to mining. There is work in progress on this (including Gavin's IBLT-based relay, or Greg's block network coding), but I don't think we should be basing the future of the economics of the system on undemonstrated ideas. Without those (or even with), the result may be that miners self-limit the size of their blocks to propagate faster, but if this happens, larger, better-connected, and more centrally-located groups of miners gain a competitive advantage by being able to produce larger blocks. I would like to point out that there is nothing evil about this - a simple feedback to determine an optimal block size for an individual miner will result in larger blocks for better connected hash power. If we do not want miners to have this ability, "we" (as in: those using full nodes) should demand limitations that prevent it. One such limitation is a block size limit (whatever it is). Ability to use a full node. Skewed incentives for improvements... without actual pressure to work on these, I doubt much will change. Increasing the size of blocks now will simply make it cheap enough to continue business as usual for a while - while forcing a massive cost increase (and not just a monetary one) on the entire ecosystem. Fees and long-term incentives. I don't think 1 MB is optimal. Block size is a compromise between scalability of transactions and verifiability of the system. A system with 10 transactions per day that is verifiable by a pocket calculator is not useful, as it would only serve a few large bank's settlements. A system which can deal with every coffee bought on the planet, but requires a Google-scale data center to verify is also not useful, as it would be trivially out-competed by a VISA-like design. The usefulness needs in a balance, and there is no optimal choice for everyone. We can choose where that balance lies, but we must accept that this is done as a trade-off, and that that trade-off will have costs such as hardware costs, decreasing anonymity, less independence, smaller target audience for people able to fully validate, ... Choose wisely.
this list is not a good place for making progress or reaching decisions. if Bitcoin continues on its current growth trends it will run out of capacity, almost certainly by some time next year. What we need to see right now is leadership and a plan, that fits in the available time window. I no longer believe this community can reach consensus on anything protocol related. When the money supply eventually dwindles I doubt it will be fee pressure that funds mining What I don't see from you yet is a specific and credible plan that fits within the next 12 months and which allows Bitcoin to keep growing.
We've successfully reached consensus for several softfork proposals already. I agree with others that hardfork need to be uncontroversial and there should be consensus about them. If you have other ideas for the criteria for hardfork deployment all I'm ears. I just hope that by "What we need to see right now is leadership" you don't mean something like "when Gaving and Mike agree it's enough to deploy a hardfork" when you go from vague to concrete. Oh, so your answer to "bitcoin will eventually need to live on fees and we would like to know more about how it will look like then" it's "no bitcoin long term it's broken long term but that's far away in the future so let's just worry about the present". I agree that it's hard to predict that future, but having some competition for block space would actually help us get more data on a similar situation to be able to predict that future better. What you want to avoid at all cost (the block size actually being used), I see as the best opportunity we have to look into the future. this is my plan: we wait 12 months... and start having full blocks and people having to wait 2 blocks for their transactions to be confirmed some times. That would be the beginning of a true "fee market", something that Gavin used to say was his #1 priority not so long ago (which seems contradictory with his current efforts to avoid that from happening). Having a true fee market seems clearly an advantage. What are supposedly disastrous negative parts of this plan that make an alternative plan (ie: increasing the block size) so necessary and obvious. I think the advocates of the size increase are failing to explain the disadvantages of maintaining the current size. It feels like the explanation are missing because it should be somehow obvious how the sky will burn if we don't increase the block size soon. But, well, it is not obvious to me, so please elaborate on why having a fee market (instead of just an price estimator for a market that doesn't even really exist) would be a disaster.
No. What I meant is that someone (theoretically Wladimir) needs to make a clear decision. If that decision is "Bitcoin Core will wait and watch the fireworks when blocks get full", that would be showing leadership I will write more on the topic of what will happen if we hit the block size limit... I don't believe we will get any useful data out of such an event. I've seen distributed systems run out of capacity before. What will happen instead is technological failure followed by rapid user abandonment... we need to hear something like that from Wladimir, or whoever has the final say around here.
it is true that "universally uncontroversial" (which is what I think the requirement should be for hard forks) is a vague qualifier that's not formally defined anywhere. I guess we should only consider rational arguments. You cannot just nack something without further explanation. If his explanation was "I will change my mind after we increase block size", I guess the community should say "then we will just ignore your nack because it makes no sense". In the same way, when people use fallacies (purposely or not) we must expose that and say "this fallacy doesn't count as an argument". But yeah, it would probably be good to define better what constitutes a "sensible objection" or something. That doesn't seem simple though. it seems that some people would like to see that happening before the subsidies are low (not necessarily null), while other people are fine waiting for that but don't want to ever be close to the scale limits anytime soon. I would also like to know for how long we need to prioritize short term adoption in this way. As others have said, if the answer is "forever, adoption is always the most important thing" then we will end up with an improved version of Visa. But yeah, this is progress, I'll wait for your more detailed description of the tragedies that will follow hitting the block limits, assuming for now that it will happen in 12 months. My previous answer to the nervous "we will hit the block limits in 12 months if we don't do anything" was "not sure about 12 months, but whatever, great, I'm waiting for that to observe how fees get affected". But it should have been a question "what's wrong with hitting the block limits in 12 months?"
Matt Corallo: So it requires mining pools to restructure their code to support a whole new protocol essentially, potentially run a completely parallel infrastructure. So they have to essentially run two mining pools. They’ve got existing mining pools, have done a ton of work on optimizing their infrastructure and making sure everything is really well-tuned. And now, I’m showing up and ... Early Bitcoin Core developer Matt Corallo started working on Bitcoin in 2011. At that time he still attended high school and lived in Germany near Frankfurt am Main. He was a cofounder of Blockstream before he started working on open source projects for Bitcoin at Chaincode Labs in New York. We discuss many different topics, ranging from his interest in Bitcoin at the beginning, to current ... Matt Corallo is an accomplished developer in the Bitcoin space. His experience traces back to working on the Bitcoin Core code as early as 2011. His resume is unarguably impressive. Corallo played a role in founding the Bitcoin development company Blockstream and currently works as an engineer at Chaincode Labs. Corallo’s role at Chaincode Labs goes beyond making contributions to Bitcoin Core. BetterHash is een voorstel van Matt Corallo dat poogt om de decentraliteit van mining te bevorderen. Matt Corallo is al lange tijd bitcoin-ontwikkelaar en heeft al veel bijgedragen aan de verbetering van het bitcoinnetwerk. Het voorstel van Corallo scheidt het aanmaken van het nieuwgevonden block van de betaling van de beloning. Square Crypto, the division of the Hard cash App corporation targeted exclusively on bitcoin, just hired a person of the world’s most prolific bitcoin builders. Chaincode Labs alum and Blockstream co-founder Matt Corallo earlier authored notable performance enhancements these as the rust-lightning implementation, which tends to make it simpler for people to establish and interact […]
Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency Mining Pools Explained Best Mining Pools PPS vs PPLNS - Duration: 18:17. VoskCoin 7,895 views. 18:17. How Mining Pools Work with Matt Corallo - Duration: 56:11. Off ... Matt expounds upon his project to decentralize mining, how UASF proved that Bitcoin is decentralized, why there is a somewhat-urgent need to develop a fee market to subsidize the block reward, and ... Matt (@TheBlueMatt) presents the latest developments on BetterHash, the alternative mining protocols aiming to increase miner decentralization. How to Tell If You're a Bitcoin Wizard - Matt Corallo - Duration: 6:21. CoinDesk 1,474 views. 6:21. Meditations of Marcus Aurelius - SUMMARIZED - (22 Stoic Principles to Live by) - Duration: 31:14 ... Matt Corallo presents a special presentation on Blockchain technologies. Slides of the presentation here: http://goo.gl/hwtTYc